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Abstract: Do citizens and professional judges agree on the accuracy of sentences? While surveys 
regularly point out a demand by citizens for harsher punishment, the differences between surveys’ 
and real decisions’ conditions are large enough to cast a doubt on the results. The introduction of 
two jurors into a court composed of three professional judges in two French regions and for a 
subsample of crimes in 2012 offers a good natural experiment for documenting the question of 
the differences between professional judges and citizens. Difference-in-differences or triple-
difference methods do not permit me to identify any change in the probability of being convicted 
or in sentences given by a court including jurors. If some characteristics of the reform could 
partly explain those null results, they clearly go against the hypothesis of a major disagreement 
between professional judges and citizens when they have to make real decisions in criminal cases. 
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1. Introduction 
Numerous countries all over the world include juries in their criminal procedures. Juries are frequently 
used in the judgement of the most severe cases. However, they can also be associated with judicial 
proceedings (in the United States) or decisions on sentence enforcement (Belgium, Italy) 2. Regarding 
trial decisions, jurors can decide convictions (England, United States) or both conviction and sentence 
(France, Germany, Italy). 
The presence of jurors is usually justified by the need to connect judicial decisions and the evolution 
of society’s perceptions. In particular, jurors tend to avoid judicial decisions to be “captured” by 
professional judges only—a group that has specific socioeconomic characteristics. Additionally, jurors 
are supposed to increase courts’ legitimacy. For this reason, before 2000 in France, judicial decisions 
																																								 																					
1 I thank the French Ministry of justice (Sous direction de la Statistique et des Etudes) and especially Benjamin Camus for 
their help in obtaining and analyzing the data. Support throught ANR Labex is gratefully acknowledged. 
2 Some comparative law elements on jurors can be found at: http://www.senat.fr/leg/etudes-impact/pjl10-438-ei/pjl10-438-
ei.html (in French) 
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made by juries could not be appealed because they were supposed to be the direct reflection of 
citizens’ will3. 
Another justification of the presence of jurors in court is to increase society’s understanding of the 
criminal justice system. Jurors obtain a personal experience of justice and, through discussion with 
friends and relatives, spread some form of knowledge that legitimates the institution.  
While those arguments could be viewed as convincing, their empirical foundations have rarely been 
documented. Two main questions could be formulated. First, do jurors and professional judges make 
different decisions, and if yes, in what areas? Second, is the presence of jurors changing the way 
citizens perceive the judicial institution? 
The media frequently addresses the first of these questions, through surveys. Those surveys usually 
conclude that the majority of citizens strongly desire harsher sentences4. The demand for harshness 
seems to be perceived by judges, as their sentences increase when the media closely follow their 
decisions (Lim et al., 2015). However, the fact that people ask for harsher sentences in surveys does 
not necessarily mean that citizens’ and professional judges’ preferences diverge. Indeed, the real 
conditions of a trial, the court’s ceremonial, the study of defendants’ lives in addition to their crimes, 
the importance of a decision that could put a person in jail, the ideal of justice that comes with that 
responsibility—all of these factors probably make real decisions made by one person differ greatly 
from what he could express in a survey.  
A natural experiment that occurred in France allows documenting more precisely the differences 
between decisions made by professional judges and jurors. In 2012, the jurisdictions of seven counties 
depending on two appeals courts (Dijon and Toulouse) experimentally modified the composition of 
their criminal courts in order to include jurors. In practice, two jurors were added to the three 
professional judges in the judgement of severe violence and severe property offenses. The instigators 
of the reform—the right-wing government of Nicolas Sarkozy—presented it as a way to move justice 
closer to the will of the citizens. On the opposite side, a large number of judges saw the law as an act 
of defiance towards magistrates and a way to increase sentences for the targeted offenses. The 
opponents clearly perceived jurors as harsher than professional judges.  
The way this reform was conducted constituted a perfect natural experiment to evaluate the differences 
between jurors and professional judges in real decisions. Indeed, only specific place and specific 
crimes during a limited period of time were affected by the reform. Based on this design, it is possible 
to use several methodologies to measure the effect of the introduction of jurors: difference in 
differences among targeted crimes using non-targeted courts as a control group; difference in 
differences using non-targeted crimes in targeted courts as a control group; and triple differences. 
Those methodologies allow me to test the assertion of the evaluation report of the reform, issued in 
fall 2012 by the new government and based on interviews that stated: “no element allows us to say 
that the reform induced harsher sentences” 5. 																																								 																					
3 This was modified by a law passed in June 2000. Those decisions can now be appealed. 
4 This is, for example, the case in a survey realized in France in 2013. According to this survey, 76% of the people think that 
sentences should be harsher. See http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2013/03/21/01016-20130321ARTFIG00366-les-
francais-pour-une-justice-plus-severe-selon-un-sondage.php (in French). See also another survey published in French 
newspapers: 
http://www.contrepoints.org/2016/04/06/245801-sondage-les-francais-veulent-une-justice-plus-dure; 
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/justice-les-francais-veulent-plus-de-severite-et-de-moyens-selon-un-
sondage_1273313.html. 
5 Report to the ministry of Justice on the introduction of jurors in criminal courts in the jurisdiction of Dijon and Toulouse: 
“We first noticed that the introduction of jurors did not change the precedents in criminal courts. Especially, there is no 
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None of the methods used in this article provide any evidence of a significant change in the judicial 
decisions following the reform. Neither acquittal. nor the probability of being sentenced to prison, 
probation or suspended prison, nor the length of those sentences is affected. Standard errors of the 
estimates are small and the null effects could be interpreted as precisely estimated zeros. In addition, 
the dispersion of the sentences does not seem to be affected. Thus, the effect of the introduction of 
jurors is, at best, very limited. 
However, this null result is not sufficient to claim that judges’ and citizens’ preferences are perfectly 
equal. Indeed, in the experimental courts, jurors were less numerous than professional judges—two 
versus three. This could have restricted the capacity of the jurors to participate in the debates and to 
affect the decisions. This restriction could even have occurred voluntarily if, for example, jurors relied 
on professional judges because they did not trust their own capacities. It could also occur in a more 
constrained process if jurors expressed different preferences but were always outvoted by professional 
judges. The explanation of the null result based on difficulties in imposing their preferences is hard to 
rule out in the institutional setting of the reform. However, the explanation based on the systematic 
minority position of the juror is hardly convincing. Indeed, this could be the case only if the 
preferences of professional judges were perfectly homogeneous. If they were not, the expression of 
divergent preferences of the jurors should have changed the equilibrium that might exist when the 
professional judges acted alone.  
The literature on determinants of judicial decisions is relatively old. A large share of it uses mock 
juries to test for the effects of procedural characteristics, case characteristics or court composition (see 
Devine et al., 2001 for a review). Others use experimental design and surveys with fictitious cases 
(see, e.g., Guthrie et al., 2007, or English et al., 2006). However, the extrapolation of those results to 
real conditions is difficult. This is a common problem for lab studies, but it could be particularly the 
case regarding judicial decisions. First, decisions are particularly important: they could lead to sending 
someone to jail for several years. Second, real crimes drive emotions—and even trauma for the most 
severe crime—in a way that clearly makes them different from fictitious cases and that could distort 
people’s behaviour. Lastly, the ceremonial nature of trials is especially designed to make offenders, 
witnesses, and experts as well as jurors aware of the importance of the moment. Those conditions 
could hardly be reconstructed in lab experiments. Then, real decisions and lab experiments could 
diverge largely. 
To overcome those problems, several recent papers studied real judicial decisions. Among them. it is 
possible to distinguish at least three groups. The first group focused on the cognitive bias of the 
judges: gambler’s fallacy (Chen et al., 2016), mood (Chen, 2014) or tiredness (Dantziger et al., 2011). 
The second group focused on the characteristics of the actors: judges, jurors, defendants, and victims. 
Those papers studied the importance of race (Anwar et al., 2012a), age (Anwar et al., 2012b), sex 
(Schanzenbach, 2005; Philippe, 2016), political opinions (Berdejó et Yuchtman, 2013; Anwar et al., 
2014), familial structure (Glym et Sen, 2015), skills (for the lawyer: Abrams and Yoon, 2007). The 
last group focused on the influence of exogenous events: conflicts (Shayo and Zussman, 2011), media 
coverage of crime and judicial errors (Philippe and Ouss, 2016), media pressure on judges (Lim et al., 
2015). 
Those papers documented numerous factors affecting judicial decisions. They usually focused on 
either professional judges or jurors, and the importance of courts’ experience is rarely addressed (see, 																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																														
evidence of harsher sentences. Interviews go in the direction of a null effect or higher leniency due to empathy for the 
defendants while their personal life has been presented”. 
http://www.presse.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/1_1_Rapport_bilan_experimentation_citoyens_assesseurs.pdf 
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however, Philippe Ouss, 2016). This comes from the fact that professional judges and jurors are 
usually involved in very different courts and that their decisions could hardly be compared (jurors are 
usually involved in the most severe cases). For this reason, the natural experiment that occurred in 
France offered a rare occasion to document the alleged differences between professional judges and 
jurors. 
The paper is organized as followed. Section 2 provides an overview of the institutional context. 
Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 present the empirical strategy and section 5 the results using the 
strategies presented. The last section discusses the results and conclusions. 
 
 
2. Institutional context 
 2.1. French penal structure 
The French criminal code distinguishes three different types of crime, defined by their sentences and 
the courts that judge them. 
The less severe crimes are the “contraventions”. This group includes the vast majority of road-related 
offenses as well as minor violence. Infractions cannot be punished by prison. A single judge decides 
sentences. 
The second category—the “délits”, translated in this paper as “misdemeanour”—includes crimes that 
can be punished by sentences of up to ten years. It contains the vast majority of property crimes, 
violent crimes, drug-related offenses, and minor sex crimes as well as some road-related offenses 
(driving under influence or without a license) and other less numerous types of crime (e.g., forgery, 
insults). This is the type of crime this paper focuses on. Apart from the experiment studied here, the 
court is composed of three professional judges (both for the first-instance proceeding and for appeal). 
Between 600,000 and 650,000 such crimes are judged each year. In 2011, the year before the reform, 
25% of the crimes were punishable by one prison year, 50% were punishable by two to four years and 
25% were punishable by five years or more. In practice, sentences are far below the maximum. In 
2011, the average sentence was equal to 46 prison days, 28 probation days and 20 suspended prison 
days. Of the defendants, 80% get no prison sentences, and only 4.4% get one year or more.  
The third category is the most severe crimes. They are mainly sex crimes (rape, paedophilia, etc.), 
homicides, very severe violence and armed robbery. Those crimes are punishable by more than 10 
years. Between 2,500 and 3,000 are judged per year. The court is composed of professional judges and 
jurors6. This is the only category in which jurors are included in the judicial process in France (apart 
from the experiment). 
A map of the territorial organization of the French criminal justice system is presented in figure 1. 
Regarding misdemeanours, the metropolitan territory is organized in 155 first-instance courts (164 
including Corsica and overseas territories) depending on 30 appeals courts (36 including Corsica and 
overseas territories). The superior court, held in Paris, only makes judgements based on the statutes. 
Those (very rare) judgements will not be considered in this work. 
 																																								 																					
6 Nine jurors (12 in appeals) before 2012, 6 (9 in appeals) after 2012. 
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 2.2. The reform introducing jurors in court judging misdemeanours 
A law passed on 11 August 2011 introduced jurors into courts judging misdemeanours on an 
experimental basis beginning on 1 January 2012. The experimental courts were the appeals courts of 
Dijon and Toulouse and the nine first-instance courts that are under their authority. In those 
jurisdictions, two jurors were added to the three professional judges who normally hear the cases. This 
modification occurred only for a limited set of crimes: some violent crimes, sex crimes and property 
crimes that are punishable by five years or more.  
The government justified the experiment by the fact that “the low participation of the citizens in the 
functioning of justice” leads to “decisions that do not take into account the evolutions of society”7. 
According to the government: 
citizens could think that judicial decisions do not take into account the evolution of the society. 
In comparison with other countries, one could also claim that the limited participation of the 
citizens in judicial decisions does not allow a good understanding of the institution (…). The 
law aims at increasing citizens’ participation in the judicial system. Social cohesion and the 
state’s legitimacy could only be reinforced by this reform. 
Thus, officially, the goal of the reform was to move the citizens closer to their justice system. 
However, this is not the way the reform was interpreted by the opposition, the judges—and more 
generally the lawyers—and the press. The introduction of jurors into courts for misdemeanours was 
perceived as a sign of the ruling political establishment’s distrust of judges8. Moreover, the law was 
interpreted as a way of increasing sentences—in a context in which judges were criticized as being too 
lenient—one year before the presidential election. Along those lines, during the parliamentary debates, 
the first speaker of the opposition denounced the law:  
the only meaning I see in your bill, Mr. Minister of Justice, is the distrust of judges. (…) Indeed, 
you want to supervise judges—whom you perceived as excessively lenient—with citizens—
whom you expect to be more severe. 
In the same line, the Syndicat de la magistrature (left-wing union representing between a quarter and a 
third of the magistrates) stated, “moreover, the second objective of this law—and probably the only 
one that is important for the political power—is to fight against the alleged leniency of the judges”. 
After taking place in the jurisdictions under the authority of the appeals courts of Toulouse and Dijon 
beginning on 1 January 2012, the reform was supposed to be generalized to the entire country 
beginning on 1 January 2013. The new minister of justice, Christiane Taubira, appointed in May 2012 
after the presidential election9, first asked for an audit of the reform by two high-ranking judges (see 
Salvat and Boccon-Gibod, 2013). Their report was based on interviews of judges, lawyers, defendants 
and former jurors in the treated jurisdictions. It concluded that the reform improved the perception of 
the justice system among jurors and their relatives; slowed down and weighted courtroom sessions 
mainly because the judges had to explain procedures to the jurors; did not affect sentences because 
jurors left those decisions to the professional judges; did not affect defendants; and increased the cost 
																																								 																					
7 Preamble. 
8 This lack of trust has been symbolized by Nicolas Sarkozy’s sentence comparing judges to peas with same color and same 
taste (October 2007, 7th, TV program “vivement dimanche prochain”). Less anecdotally, the law introducing mandatory 
sentences passed 4 years before was also perceived as a lack of trust. 
9 The presidential election held in May 2012 led to a change of the political majority. François Hollande, a liberal, was 
elected to succeed Nicolas Sarkozy, a conservative. 
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of justice. Based on those observations, the ministry of justice cancelled the experiment and gave up 
the reform on 1 January 2013. 
At the end of the day, only specific crimes in the courts under the authority of 2 appeals courts —over 
thirty—were affected for a year.  
 
 
3. Data 
 3.1. Discharges 
The first decisions of interest are convictions. Discharges are not individually recorded in France. 
Indeed, the judicial system cannot record information on anyone who has not been convicted. 
However, the number of cases as well as the number of convictions is recorded at the court level. The 
difference gives the number of discharges. 
This article uses information on discharges per first-instance courts (155 units) and per month between 
January 2011 and December 2012. For each court and month, the data set contains the number of 
cases and the number of discharges for two types of crimes: those targeted by the law—part of violent 
crimes and property crimes that are punishable by five years or more—and those that are not targeted 
among property and violent crimes (control group). In the latter group, only violent crimes and 
property crimes have been conserved. In particular, road-related offenses and drug crimes have been 
excluded, as none of them belong to the treatment group. 
On average, discharges are rare. They represent 7.25% of the cases over the period. They slightly 
decrease in 2012 in the treated areas for both targeted crimes (7.4% to 7%) and non-targeted crimes 
(6.9% to 6.5%). At the same time, they remain stable (8.1%) for targeted crimes or slightly increase 
(7% to 7.2%) for non-targeted crimes in the control courts. 
 
 3.2. Sentences 
The main data set used here comes from criminal record compilations from the statistics service of the 
French Ministry of Justice (Sous Direction de la Statistique et des Etudes). These compilations contain 
the results and details of almost all criminal cases judged each year. Only the smallest infractions (e.g., 
parking offenses in the “contraventions” category defined above) are not registered. In particular, the 
compilations contain all misdemeanours. Procedural characteristics, date, place, precise facts and 
descriptions of sentences are available. Sociodemographic variables such as age, sex, and nationality 
are also included. 
Data from 2008 to 2014 are used in this paper. The reform studied here targeted only some, but not all, 
violent crimes and property crimes for which offenders could be sentenced to five or more years in 
prison. In order to minimize the distance between targeted and non-targeted crimes used as control 
group in some regressions, the dataset is restricted to violence and property crimes that could be 
sentenced to five years and more. In this subgroup, approximately 33% of the crimes are targeted. 
The final data set contains 597,000 observations (over approximately 4 million misdemeanours and 
1.3 million violent crimes and property crimes). Crimes that are targeted by the reform represent 33% 
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of this data set. The sample sizes of the different groups over the different periods are presented in 
table 1. The treated sample—i.e., treated infractions in treated courts in 2012—regroups 1,352 
observations. 
Descriptive statistics of this sample are presented in table 2. Columns 1 (treated areas) and 2 (other 
areas) present the descriptive statistics for targeted crimes. Columns 3 (treated areas) and 4 (other 
area) present the same information for non-targeted crimes.  
Defendants are mainly males—this is even truer for targeted crimes, with 93% male—and French 
(approximately 80%). They are on average 30 years old, and the majority have been previously 
convicted of a crime. Targeted crimes receive more severe sentences: 50% get a prison sentence—
compared to only 35% for non-targeted crimes—and the average length is 6 months—compared to 
less than 3 months for non-targeted crimes.  
 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
 4.1. Method 
The introduction of jurors into courts judging misdemeanours at one moment in time in a small group 
of courts and for a small group of crimes allows me to evaluate the reform using three different 
strategies: two difference in difference and one triple difference.  
The first difference in difference is based on crimes that have been targeted by the law. It uses the 
courts under the authority of the appeals courts of Toulouse and Dijon as the treatment groups and the 
rest of France as the control group. The effects are measured using regressions of the form: 𝑌!,!",! = 𝛼!" + 𝛾! + 𝛽! ∗ 1!"#! ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!" + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑋! + 𝜀! (1) 
where 𝑌!,!",! is the outcome of interest—conviction, prison sentence—for person i judged in the area 
of the appeals court ac during year t; 𝛼!" are fixed effects for the areas depending on the appeals 
courts (30 different appeals courts); 𝛾! are year fixed effects; 1!"#! is a dummy equal to one in 2012; 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!" is a dummy equal to one in the area depending on the appeals courts of Toulouse and Dijon; 𝑋! are control variables (crime, age, sex, etc.); and 𝛽! is the parameter of interest. It measures the 
evolution of variable 𝑌 in 2012 in treated areas. This strategy leads to my preferred estimate as 
treatment and control group are very close before the reform (see table 2). 
The second difference in difference uses only trial in the treated areas. It uses non-targeted crimes as 
the control group. As mentioned before, the data set is restricted to types of crime—violent crimes and 
property crimes—that are punishable by five years or more in prison. Thus control group is composed 
of crime that are not very different from the targeted ones.  
With this difference in difference, the effects are measured using regressions of the form: 𝑌!,!"#$% ! = 𝜃!é!"# + 𝛾! + 𝛽! ∗ 1!"#! ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!"#$% + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑋! + 𝜀! (2) 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!"#$% is equal to one for the crime targeted by the reform. 
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Finally, it is possible to combine those two approaches by using triple difference in difference 
strategy. The effects are measured using regressions of the form: 𝑌!,!",!é!"#,! = 𝜃!é!"# + 𝛼!" + 𝛾! + 𝛽! ∗ 1!"#! ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!" 𝛽! ∗ 1!"#! ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 + 𝛽! ∗ 1!"#! ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!"#$% ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!" + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑋! + 𝜀!  (3) 
The parameter of interest is now 𝛽! that measure the specific evolution of targeted crimes in treated 
areas in 2012.  
 
 4.2. Balancing checks 
The identification strategies presented here are valid only if offenders in the treatment groups are not 
correlated with any changes in offenders’ characteristics. To test for this possible bias, it is possible to 
run balancing checks. The idea is to run the regressions 1, 2 and 3 presented above using offenders’ 
socioeconomic or procedural characteristics as the outcome variables. Those variables are not 
available when defendants are not convicted. Thus, balancing tests could be realized only for offenders 
who were convicted. 
The effects of the reform on age, nationality (dummy equal to one if the defendant is French), gender 
(dummy equal to one if the defendant is a woman), past conviction (dummy equal to one if the 
defendant has been previously convicted in the past five years), investigation length and pretrial 
detention days are successively measured. The first four variables should not be affected. The last two 
variables could be affected if the introduction of jurors slows down the court sessions. 
The results are presented in table 3. Panel A, in the upper part of the table, presents the results for the 
difference in difference using non-targeted courts as a control group (following equation 1). Panel B, 
in the central part, presents the results for the difference in difference using non-targeted crime as a 
control group (following equation 3). Panel C, at the bottom, presents the results for the triple 
difference in difference (following equation 3). Sample sizes are presented after the label of the panel. 
It is larger for the triple difference in difference, which uses all of the relevant information (panel C, 
597,156 observations), and lower for the difference in difference using non-treated crimes as a control 
group because this sample is restricted to the treated area (panel B, 27,299 observations). Only the 
relevant coefficients (𝛽!,𝛽! and 𝛽!) are presented. 
Coefficients presented in table 3 are mainly small and not significant. According to the triple-
difference estimate, the reform decreases the proportion of female defendants, but this result is not 
confirmed by the difference in difference. Table 3 confirms that the introduction of jurors into 
criminal courts judging misdemeanours did not affect defendant characteristics or procedural 
variables. 
  
 
5. The effect of introducing jurors on judicial decisions 
 5.1. Graphic evidence 
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Before going into the details of the regressions, it is possible to present the evolution over time of the 
main variables for the different subgroups. As previously mentioned, four groups could be 
distinguished: targeted crimes in treated areas, targeted crimes in non-treated areas, non-targeted 
crimes in treated area and non-targeted crimes in non-treated areas. 
The discharge rates per year and subgroup are presented in figure 2. They increase in the treated areas 
for targeted crimes while they decrease for the same crimes in non-treated areas. However, the 
standard deviations are large, as discharges are measured at the court level. Differences do not seem to 
be significant.  
The evolution of the probability of being convicted to prison per group is presented in figure 3. Figure 
4 presents the evolution of prison sentences’ length per group (set to zero if no prison). Targeted 
crimes in treated areas do not seem to be more or less severely punished during 2012, the year of the 
reform. This is true both in comparison to preceding/upcoming years and in comparison to other 
groups. 
The same absence of effect is observable for probation time or suspended prison time (see appendix 
A). A more precise visualization, per month and using a synthetic control method, is presented in 
appendix B. It leads to the same absence of results. 
 
 5.2. Main results 
As cases characteristics are not affected by the reform, it is now possible to measure the effect of the 
introduction of jurors on judicial decisions. The main goal is to see if, as the opponents of the reform 
feared, the introduction of jurors induced harsher decisions. Several outcomes are of interest here. It is 
first important to measure whether the proportion of discharges is affected. It is both a crucial outcome 
and an important thing to measure before turning to sentences. If convictions are affected, and the pool 
of sentences observed changes over time, this must be taken into account in the analysis. The second 
main outcome is sentences. Several variables are used here: the probability of being sentenced to 
prison, probation or a suspended prison sentence and the length of the prison sentence, probation or 
suspended prison sentence. 
Table 4 presents the main results. They are presented in a similar way as in table 3. Panel A presents 
the first difference in difference using a non-targeted court as a control group and based on equation 1; 
panel B presents the second difference in difference using non-targeted crimes as a control group and 
based on equation 2; Panel C presents the triple difference in difference. 
The first column of table 4 presents the effect of the reform on discharges. The unit of observation is 
the court, which is why sample sizes are much smaller than for columns 2 to 7. The different estimates 
do not provide any evidence of an effect of the reform on discharges. Coefficients go from 0.5% to 
1.5%, and the most precisely estimated one (in panel B) has a small standard error of 0.2%. Thus, 
column 1 could be interpreted as a null effect of the introduction of jurors on discharges even if a very 
small positive effect cannot be fully excluded. If anything, coefficients go in the direction of an 
increase in the discharge rate, which contradicts the idea that jurors are more severe. 
Columns 2 to 7 measure the effect of the reform on sentences for convicted people. Columns 2-4 
present the results on the extensive margin. The outcome variables are dummy equal to one if 
defendants are sentenced to any prison time (column 2), any probation time (column 3) or any 
suspended prison time (column 4). Columns 5-7 present the results at the intensive margin. Outcome 
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variables are the length, in days, of prison sentences (from 0 to 10 years, column 5), probation (from 
zero to 5 years, column 6) and suspended prison sentences (from 0 to 5 years, column 7). 
Only one of the heightened coefficients presented in columns 2-7 is statistically significant. Using 
difference in difference for targeted crime (panel A), the probability of being sentenced to some 
suspended prison time (column 4) increases by almost 3% when jurors are present in the court. 
However, this result is not confirmed by the other two strategies. 
Regarding the probability of getting some prison time (column 2), point estimates of the effect go 
from -0.5% (panel C) to -2% (panel A) with standard errors of approximately 1.5%. Considering that 
the average probability of getting prison time for targeted crimes is approximately 50%, this could be 
interpreted as a relatively well-estimated null effect. The same is true for the probability of getting a 
suspended prison sentence (column 3). Coefficients go from -0.3% to -2.2% with small standard errors 
(approximately 1.5%) for an average of 35% for targeted crimes. Note that all coefficients in columns 
2 and 3 are negative. If anything, the effect seems to be in the direction of more lenient decisions when 
jurors are included. 
Turning to length of sentences, the results are, once again, insignificant. They are marginally less 
precisely estimated—point estimates are slightly higher compared to the averages—but coherent in 
their absence of results. Regarding prison terms (column 5), point estimates go from -4 to 6 with a 
standard error of approximately 8, while average sentences for targeted crimes are approximately 185 
days. If anything, the effect is limited. The same is true for probation (column 6) and suspended prison 
sentences (column 7). 
The results for discharges are similar if partial discharge (instead of full discharge) is used as the 
outcome variable (Appendix C, table C1, column1). The results for sentences are similar if the sample 
is restricted to 2011-2012 except that the probability of getting some probation time seems 
significantly affected when using difference in difference (Appendix C, table C1, panel A and B, 
column 3). Lastly, permutation tests measuring the effect of placebo reforms occurring in the 
jurisdictions of two random appeals courts confirm that the results presented in table 4 are small and 
not significant (see appendix C, figure C1, for the distribution of the coefficients when measuring the 
effect of placebo reforms on prison time).  
All in all, the results presented in table 4 do not support the idea that introducing jurors into the court 
had a general effect on convictions or sentences. All three methodologies used provide precisely 
estimated coefficients that are not different from zero. This is consistent with what was (not) observed 
in the graphs. If anything, the effects of the reform are small and go in the direction of more lenient 
judgement. 
 
 5.3. Variability of the sentences 
Lastly, it is possible that, although the reform did not change judicial decisions, the introduction of 
jurors increased the variability of the sentences. Indeed, as jurors changed frequently and as they could 
have heterogeneous preferences—especially because they did not have a common norm or training, as 
did professional judges, who could be more uniform—they could distort the sentences in many 
different ways that sum to zero mean but increase heterogeneity.  
If this was true, confidence intervals presented on figure 4 should increase for targeted crimes in 
treated courts in 2012. This does not seem to be the case. A more precise way to measure the effect of 
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the reform on sentence dispersion is to follow the evolution of the distance to mean sentences. The 
idea is to calculate the absolute value of the difference between individual sentences and average 
sentences for the same crime in the same court and then to run regressions of the form presented in the 
previous sections. 
The results are presented in table 5. Column 1 presents the effect of the reform on prison time, column 
2 on probation time and column 3 on suspended prison time. None of the coefficients are significant 
except the one for suspended prison using the first difference in difference. 
The introduction of two jury members in courts did not significantly increase the dispersion of 
sentences. 
 
 5.4. Subgroups 
Although the reform did not have a general effect on sentences, it is still possible that some subgroups 
were affected. This is possible if jurors are particularly sensitive to certain crimes. For example, it is 
possible that professional judges—who have high socioeconomic status and usually live in relatively 
rich neighbourhoods—are more sensitive to property crimes and less sensitive to violent crimes than 
the average citizen. In this case, the null effect observed in table 4 would mask the heterogeneous 
effect on different subgroups. 
This hypothesis could not be tested for discharges, as this outcome is not available at the individual 
level.  
The effect of the reform on prison sentences for different subgroups is presented in table 6. For tables 
3 and 4, the coefficients from the three different methodologies are presented. The effects on violent 
crimes or property crimes are presented in columns 1 and 2. Columns 3 and 4 present the effects for 
first-time offenders or recidivists. The last two columns present the results for men and women. 
None of the results are significant. Standard errors increased because of smaller sample sizes, but even 
beyond statistical significance, no clear pattern emerges from point estimates that are alternately 
positive and negative and always small. Thus, the general null result does not seem to hide 
heterogeneity. 
 
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
Introducing two jurors into criminal courts composed of three professional judges did not have any 
detectable effect. Neither convictions nor sentences—at the extensive or the intensive margin—were 
affected. This absence of a significant result is observed with all three strategies used: difference in 
difference or triple difference. The effects of the reform, if any, were small and pointed in the direction 
of a decrease in the severity of the courts. 
This null result could have different origins. First, it is possible that judges and jurors shared common 
preferences regarding convictions and sentences. This interpretation contradicts surveys mentioned by 
the instigators of the law, who stated that French citizens had asked for harsher punishments. 
However, as mentioned in the introduction, those surveys elicited general theoretical opinions on 
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sentences that could differ strongly from opinions on real cases. Moreover, the people surveyed could 
be more extreme when they had to express their opinions without making real decisions. While several 
studies find that experience can affect the way people decide cases (Devine et al. 2001; Philippe and 
Ouss 2016), the differences in average preferences seem far smaller than what is measured in surveys. 
Even if it seems to be the most plausible one, the interpretation in terms of equality in preferences is 
not the only one. It is also possible that preferences diverged but that jurors were always outvoted by 
the professional judges. This could be the case, as the reform introduced two jurors into courts already 
composed of three professional judges. However, this possibility seems unlikely. Indeed, it could only 
be true if the professional judges had homogeneous preferences and voted for exactly same decisions. 
If this is not the case, then the average decision of professional judges will come from a mix of harsher 
and more lenient decisions that average to something in the middle. In this case, if jurors had 
preferences that were harsher (or more lenient) than the average decision of the professional judges, 
then they should have modified the equilibrium upward (or downward).  
Lastly, it is possible that jurors mainly did not express any preferences. This could be the case for 
several reasons. First, their weight in the procedure was small. Of course, they voted on sentences, but 
they did not have the investigation files in advance, they did not lead the debates and, as mentioned 
before, there were only two of them. Second, their limited knowledge of law and their inexperience in 
practical judicial decisions could have made them consider their presence in the court more as an 
interesting experience than as participation in the judicial process. For those reasons, they could have 
relied on the professional judges’ advice and let them decide the cases. The author of the audit when 
asked by the ministry of justice in 2012 stated this hypothesis. 
Even if it is hard to fully rule out alternative hypothesis, the results presented in this paper clearly go 
against the idea of a great difference in preferences between professional judges and the rest of 
society. However, it is possible that limited divergences did not affect the equilibrium for procedural 
reasons. 
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	Figure	1:	French	judicial	and	administrative	organization.		
Note:	red	dots	represent	first	instance	courts.	Small	houses	are	appeal	courts.	Grey	lines	
are	administrative	frontiers	of	the	counties.	Additional	red	lines	represent	additional	
“judicial“	frontiers	when	a	county	contains	several	first	instance	courts.	Adjoining	counties	
with	the	same	color	depend	on	the	same	appeal	court.	
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	Figure	2:	Average	discharge	probability	per	group	and	per	year.			
	Figure	3:	Average	probability	to	get	a	prison	sentence	per	group	and	per	year.				
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	Figure	4:	Average	prison	sentences	per	group	and	per	year.		 	
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Crime	 Area	
Nb	obs,		
pre	2012	
Nb	obs,		
2012	
Nb	obs,	
post	2012	
Treat	 Treat	 5,656	 1,352	 2,518	
Treat	 Control	 112,444	 27,182	 48,912	
Control	 Treat	 10,398	 2,466	 4,929	
Control	 Control	 226,126	 53,955	 102,532		Table	1:	Sample	sizes	in	the	different	treatment	and	control	groups	per	year.			
		 Targeted	crimes	 Non	targeted	crimes	
	
Dijon-Toulouse	 Other	 Dijon-Toulouse	 Other	
Sex	 .07	 .07	 .14	 .14	
Age	 30.3	 30.2	 29.8	 29.9	
French	 .86	 .83	 .82	 .81	
Former	conviction	 .51	 .52	 .51	 .51	
Investigation	length	(day)	 492	 425	 541	 494	
Pre-trial	detention	(day)	 31	 30	 11	 9	
Prison	(dummy)	 .49	 .51	 .35	 .36	
Probation	(dummy)	 .36	 .35	 .17	 .17	
Suspended	prison	(dummy)	 .29	 .3	 .31	 .3	
Prison	(day)	 185	 203	 81	 85	
Probation	(day)	 117	 116	 41	 43	
Suspended	prison	(day)	 60	 59	 36	 38	
N	 9,526	 17,793	 382,613	 188,538		Table	2:	Descriptive	statistics	of	the	treated	and	control	goups.																					
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		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
	 French	 Age	 Sex	 Past-conviction	 Investigation	length	 Pre-trial	detention	Panel	A:	diff	diff,	non	treated	areas	as	control	(N=197,615)		 		 		 		 			 	 	 	 	 	 	Treated	courts	*	2012	 0.00366	 -0.0541	 -0.00897	 -0.00329	 -19.28	 0.628		 (0.0106)	 (0.319)	 (0.00739)	 (0.0144)	 (18.33)	 (3.221)	Panel	B:	diff	diff,	non	targeted	crimes	as	control	(N=27,299)	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	Treated	crimes	*	2012	 -0.00920	 0.525	 -0.0138	 0.00154	 -4.929	 6.031*		 (0.0134)	 (0.380)	 (0.0104)	 (0.0178)	 (21.95)	 (3.306)	Panel	C:	triple	diff	(N=597,156)	
	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	Treated	crimes	*	Treated	courts	*		 0.00640	 0.357	 -0.0200**	 0.0143	 4.445	 4.828	
2012	 (0.0126)	 (0.360)	 (0.00983)	 (0.0167)	 (20.83)	 (3.172)	
Control	 Crime	fixed	effects,	court	fixed	effects,	calendar	month	fixed	effects		Table	3:	Balancing	checks.		
Coefficients	presented	in	panel	A,	B	and	C	come	from	separate	regressions.				
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
	 Discharge	 Prison	 Probation	
Suspended	
prison	 Prison	 Probation	
Suspended	
prison	
	
Dummy	 Dummies	 Quantum	
Panel	A:	diff	diff,	non	treated	areas	as	control	 		 		 		 		 		 		
	
		
	 	
		
	 	 	Treated	courts*	2012	 0.0123	 -0.0204	 -0.0175	 0.0291**	 -3.535	 -3.435	 -1.016	
	
(0.0199)	 (0.0128)	 (0.0133)	 (0.0124)	 (7.912)	 (5.821)	 (3.278)	
N	 3	599	 197	615	 197	615	 197	615	 197	615	 197	615	 197	615	
Panel	A:	diff	diff,	non	targeted	crimes	as	control	 		 		 		 		 		 		
	
		
	 	
		
	 	 	Treated	crimes	*	2012	 0.00537	 -0.0101	 -0.0220	 0.0105	 6.041	 -8.257	 -1.133	
	
(0.0209)	 (0.0153)	 (0.0152)	 (0.0153)	 (8.423)	 (6.117)	 (3.511)	
N	 426	 22	299	 22	299	 22	299	 22	299	 22	299	 22	299	
Panel	C:	triple	diff		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
	
		
	 	
		
	 	 	Treated	crimes*	Treated		 0.0154	 -0.00562	 -0.00367	 0.00575	 -4.063	 2.061	 0.663	
courts*	2012	 (0.0148)	 (0.0145)	 (0.0143)	 (0.0144)	 (7.935)	 (5.860)	 (3.289)	
N	 7	295	 597	156	 597	156	 597	156	 597	156	 597	156	 597	156	
Control	
Court	fixed	effects,	
calendar	month	
fixed	effects	
Crime	fixed	effects,	court	fixed	effects,	calendar	month	fixed	effects,	sex,	
age,	French,	past	detention,	procedural	length,	pre-trial	detention		Table	4:	Effect	of	the	introduction	of	jury	members	on	the	main	characteristics	of	penal	decisions.	
Coefficients	presented	in	panel	A,	B	and	C	come	from	separate	regressions.					
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		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
	
|	Quantum	-	mean	for	crime	in	court	|		
	
Prison	 Probation	 Suspended	prison	
Panel	A:	diff	diff,	non	treated	areas	as	control	(N=198,064)	 		
	 	 	 	Treated	courts*	2012	 -0.740	 -0.152	 -4.636**	
	
(6.203)	 (3.740)	 (2.245)	
Panel	B:	diff	diff,	non	tartegeted	crimes	as	control	(N=27,319)	
	 	 	 	Treated	crimes*	2012	 5.167	 -1.331	 -3.835	
	
(6.589)	 (4.085)	 (2.405)	
Panel	C:	triple	diff	(N=598,470)	
	 	
	 	 	 	Treated	crimes*	Treated		 -0.623	 3.289	 -0.536	
courts	*	2012	 (6.199)	 (3.862)	 (2.267)	
Control	 Crime	fixed	effects,	court	fixed	effects,	calendar	month	fixed	effects,	sex,	age,	French,	past	detention,	procedural	length,	pre-trial	detention		Table	5:	Effect	of	the	introduction	of	jury	members	on	the	absolute	value	of	the	difference	between	individual	sentences	and	average	sentences	for	the	same	crime	in	the	same	court.	
Coefficients	presented	in	panel	A,	B	and	C	come	from	separate	regressions.			
		 Quantum	prison		 Violence	 Property	crimes	 Primo-offenders	 Recidivists	 Men	 Women		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Panel	A:	diff	diff,	non	treated	areas	as	control	
	
		 		
Treated	courts	*	2012	 -0.270	 -3.375	 -2.952	 -2.570	 -4.586	 8.929		 (12.17)	 (13.34)	 (8.181)	 (13.53)	 (8.422)	 (15.28)	N	 55	978	 85	879	 95	634	 101	981	 183	234	 14	381	
Panel	B:	diff	diff,	non	targeted	crimes	as	control	
	
		 		
Treated	crimes	*	2012	 6.096	 13.38	 3.804	 14.57	 5.628	 7.446		 (25.32)	 (13.48)	 (9.008)	 (14.19)	 (9.078)	 (16.40)	N	 3	058	 16	952	 13	437	 13	862	 24	040	 3	259	
Panel	C:	triple	diff	
	 	 	
		 		
Treated	crimes	*	Treated		 -9.405	 2.256	 -10.93	 8.191	 -4.114	 1.611	
courts	*	2012	 (23.66)	 (12.96)	 (8.262)	 (13.54)	 (8.550)	 (16.39)	
N	 85	745	 352	785	 290	395	 306	761	 528	062	 69	094		Table	6:	Effect	of	the	introduction	of	jury	members	on	the	prison	length	per	sub-groups	
Coefficients	presented	in	panel	A,	B	and	C	come	from	separate	regressions.	
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Appendix	A:	Additional	graph.			
	Figure	A1:	Average	probation	sentences	per	group	and	per	year.			
	Figure	A2:	Average	suspended	prison	sentences	per	group	and	per	year.		
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Appendix	B:	synthetic	control	method.		
B.1.	Method	
	
In	 order	 to	 document	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 introduction	 of	 jury	 members	 in	 addition	 to	
professional	 judges	it	 is	possible	to	use	synthetic	Control	method	(Abadie	et	al,	2012).	This	
method	proceeds	 in	 two	 steps.	 The	 first	one	consists	 in	 constructing	 the	 synthetic	 control	
group	for	each	treated	groups,	here	the	courts	under	the	authority	of	Dijon	and	the	courts	
under	the	authority	of	Toulouse.	A	Synthetic	control	group	is	the	weighted	combination	of	
the	 control	 units	 –	 here	 the	 courts	 under	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 28	 non-targeted	 appeal	
courts	–	that	approximate	the	treated	unit	before	the	treatment.	The	second	step	consists	
simply	in	the	comparison	of	the	evolution	of	the	treatment	area	and	their	synthetic	controls	
before	and	after	the	reform.	
For	this	graphical	evidence	section,	 the	data	are	aggregated	at	 the	appeal	court	 level.	This	
means	 that	 all	 the	 courts	 that	 are	 under	 the	 authority	 of	 one	 appeal	 court	 are	 merged	
together.	The	time	unit	is	the	month.	The	best	weighted	combinations	are	looked	separately	
for	 Toulouse	 and	 Dijon.	 The	 other	 treated	 unit	 is	 excluded	 (i.e.	 Toulouse	 is	 not	 in	 the	
synthetic	control	of	Dijon	and	vice	versa).	The	synthetic	controls	are	the	best	predictor	for	
the	following	pre-reform	characteristics:		
- Proportions,	 among	 targeted	 crimes,	 of	 women,	 French,	 recidivist,	 conviction	 to	
prison,	conviction	to	probation,	conviction	to	suspended	prison;		
- Means,	for	targeted	crimes,	of	age,	investigation	length,	prison	sentences,	probation	
sentences,	and	suspended	prison	sentences.		
- Means,	 for	 non-targeted	 crimes,	 of	 prison	 sentences,	 probation	 sentences,	
suspended	prison	sentences.	
The	 results	 on	 discharges	 only	 use	 2011-2012.	 Results	 on	 sentences	 use	 the	 entire	 2008-
2014	period.	
	
	
B.2.	Results	
	
The	 best	 weighted	 combinations	 used	 for	 the	main	 outcomes	 are	 presented	 in	 table	 B1.	
Note	that	the	areas	under	the	jurisdiction	of	Paris,	Lyon	or	Marseille	(the	court	is	In	Aix),	the	
biggest	one,	are	never	used	(their	weight	is	zero).		
Figure	B1	present	the	evolution	of	the	discharge	probability	for	the	treated	offenses	in	Dijon	
(figure	 B1a)	 and	 Toulouse	 (figure	 B1b)	 in	 comparison	 to	 their	 respective	 synthetic	 control	
unit	over	2011-2012.	The	periods	during	which	 jury	members	have	been	 introduced	 in	the	
court	of	the	judicial	region	of	Toulouse	and	Dijon,	2012,	is	indicated	in	grey.		
Because	of	the	 limited	sample	size	(each	observation	per	month	 is	the	aggregation	of	only	
few	courts)	and	the	low	discharge	rate,	the	evolutions	in	the	treated	courts	are	volatiles	and	
the	pre-reform	evolutions	are	not	very	close.	No	clear	divergence	appears	after	the	reform.	
The	probability	of	discharge	does	not	seem	to	increase	or	decrease	in	Dijon	and	Toulouse	in	
comparison	to	their	synthetic	control	group.	
The	same	type	of	results	is	presented	in	figure	B2	and	B3	for	the	probability	to	be	sentenced	
to	prison	or	the	average	quantum	of	prison	for	the	offenses	targeted	by	the	reform.	Results	
for	Dijon	are	presented	in	figure	B2a	and	B3a.	Results	for	Toulouse	are	presented	in	figure	
B2b	and	B3b.	Contrarily	to	figure	B1,	the	evolution	presented	in	figures	B2	and	B3	aggregate	
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numerous	individual	observations.	This	is	the	reason	why	the	evolution	are	less	volatile	and	
the	pre-reform	correlation	between	 treatment	units	and	 their	 synthetic	 controls	are	more	
similar.	Note	also	that	the	period	used	is	longer.		
While	 figure	 B2	 and	 B3	 are	more	 precise	 they	 do	 not	 provide	 suggestive	 evidence	 of	 an	
effect	 of	 the	 introduction	 of	 jury	 members	 in	 criminal	 courts.	 During	 the	 period	 of	 the	
reform,	 the	probability	 to	be	sentenced	to	prison	as	well	as	 the	average	sentences	do	not	
seem	to	diverge	significantly	in	the	treated	courts.	The	same	(absence	of)	result	is	observed	
when	using	probation	or	investigation	length	as	the	outcome	(figure	B4	and	B5).				
		 Discharges	 Prison	(dummy)	 Prison	(quantum)	
Jurisdictions	 Dijon	 Toulouse	 Dijon	 Toulouse	 Dijon	 Toulouse	
Agen	 .015	 .191	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Aix	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Amiens	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Angers	 0	 0	 .255	 0	 .22	 0	
Bastia	 .167	 0	 .014	 0	 .013	 0	
Besançon	 0	 .249	 0	 .065	 0	 .085	
Bordeaux	 .144	 .259	 .145	 0	 .141	 0	
Bourges	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Caen	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Chambéry	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Colmar	 0	 0	 0	 .341	 0	 .331	
Douai	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Grenoble	 0	 0	 0	 .537	 0	 .555	
Limoges	 0	 .166	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Lyon	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Metz	 .178	 .134	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Montpellier	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Nancy	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Nîmes	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Orléans	 0	 0	 .224	 0	 .222	 0	
Paris	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Pau	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Poitiers	 .135	 0	 .003	 0	 0	 0	
Reims	 .361	 0	 .36	 0	 .404	 0	
Rennes	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Riom	 0	 0	 0	 .057	 0	 .029	
Rouen	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Versailles	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0		Table	B1:	weight	used	in	the	construction	of	the	synthetic	control	group.				
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	 	(a)		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (b)	Figure	B1:	Average	discharge	probability	in	treated	courts	and	in	their	synthetic	control.			
	 	(a)		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (b)	Figure	B2:	Average	probability	to	get	a	prison	sentence	in	treated	courts	and	in	their	synthetic	control.				
	 	(a)		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (b)	Figure	B3:	Average	prison	sentences	in	treated	courts	and	in	their	synthetic	control.	 	
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	 	(a)		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (b)	Figure	B4:	Average	probation	sentences	in	treated	courts	and	in	their	synthetic	control.			
	 	(a)		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (b)	Figure	B5:	Average	suspended	prison	sentences	in	treated	courts	and	in	their	synthetic	control.		
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Appendix	C		 	
	Figure	C1:	kernel	distribution	of	the	coefficients	of	placebo	difference	in	difference	using	targeted	crimes.	The	treated	areas	of	the	placebo	are	composed	of	the	courts	under	the	authority	of	two	random	appeal	courts.	The	red	line	indicates	the	coefficient	of	the	diff	in	diff	when	real	treated	areas	are	used.			
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
	 Discharges	 Prison	 Probation	 Suspended	prison	 Prison	 Probation	 Suspended	prison		 Dummy	 Dummies,	2011-2012	 Quantum,	2011-2012	Panel	A:	diff	diff,	non	treated	area	as	control	 		 		 		 		 		 			 		 	 	 		 	 	 	Treated	courts	*	2012	 0.0123	 0.0180	 -0.0351**	 0.0136	 21.26**	 -9.869	 -1.887		 (0.0199)	 (0.0168)	 (0.0176)	 (0.0158)	 (9.779)	 (7.803)	 (4.414)	N	 3	599	 57	049	 57	049	 57	049	 57	049	 57	049	 57	049	
Panel	B:	diff	diff,	non	targeted	crimes	as	control		 		 		 		 		 		 			 		 	 	 		 	 	 	Treated	crimes	*	2012	 0.00537	 0.00467	 -0.0485**	 0.00616	 13.75	 -23.52***	 -1.615		 (0.0209)	 (0.0205)	 (0.0203)	 (0.0198)	 (10.46)	 (8.299)	 (4.746)	N	 426	 7	619	 7	619	 7	619	 7	619	 7	619	 7	619	
Panel	C:	triple	diff		 	 	 	 	 	 		 		 	 	 		 	 	 	Treated	crimes	*	Treated	
courts	*	2012	
0.0154	 -0.00551	 -0.00458	 0.00732	 -3.349	 2.445	 1.109	
(0.0148)	 (0.0145)	 (0.0143)	 (0.0145)	 (7.959)	 (5.876)	 (3.296)	
N	 7	295	 170	267	 170	267	 170	267	 170	267	 170	267	 170	267	
Control	
Court	fixed	
effects,	
calendar	month	
fixed	effects	
Crime	fixed	effects,	court	fixed	effects,	calendar	month	fixed	effects,	sex,	age,	
French,	past	detention,	procedural	length,	pre-trial	detention		Table	C1:	Replication	of	the	main	results	using	a	restricted	time	period.		
Coefficients	presented	in	panel	A,	B	and	C	come	from	separate	regressions.	
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